Scientific Brain Model Chapter V

 CHAPTER V - How our conceptual framework slowly developed throughout Evolution?: We learned concepts as we learned the language, and - as we learned the language - conscious thought slowly developed and became more elaborate.

 * Given we can observe everywhere in Nature, how stable patterns of miraculously spectacular complexity and beauty form from very basic dynamics, we need not to resort on any magical intelligent decision-making agent to explain the rise of a sense of self-awareness and the expression of rational thinking and intelligent behaviors.  

If we enjoy so much to portray ourselves as intelligent and rational animals, we realy need to back our tedious full-of-ourselves boasting doing something more than just resorting on the assumption of a intelligent agent. to explain the origin of our "intelligence" and reasoning powers. If we allege Science to be the ultimate proof of our superior intellect, then it represents in itself nothing but a sheer oxymoron to approach this capital and essential question turning yet again to magical thinking, instead of scientific reasoning. At a minimum, we need to explore if, perhaps, we can do without any physical manifestation of our agency; but it is possible to explain the emergence of something like an animated voice from the cooperation and competition between populations of neurons. Perhaps it is possible to get the vehicle started up and to autonomously drive around, without the intervention of any pilot. 

* The scientific method is especially well-suited for impossibly complex, inscrutable problems, since it never requires a perfect answer, but allows to make progress in uninvolved and unassuming baby steps.  

In fact, the key advantage of following the scientific method to investigate a question of such complexity and difficulty is the mental liberation and repos it represents to know that it is not realistic to think the model will be the definite answer to the conundrum.

Indeed, since it is impossible to prove a scientific theory absolutely correct and, furthermore, in all likelihood, sooner or later any theory will ultimately be proven wrong anyway; nobody can expect you to get your model free from any flaw. Everybody is encouraged to propose something. You just try to explain as much as you can, as best as you think of. If you cannot get it perfect, do not worry; we will take it from there and extend it further. Every attempt is a step forward. We will eventually get to the end of it. On the contrary, if we remain obsessed, foolishly convinced there must be some magical light bulb; we will be forever stuck, looking for something that all the evidence indicates does not exist anyway. The brain is an impossibly intricate network of gazillions of neurons. The idea that we may be able to decipher the sort of computations going on in there, and figure out the exact underpinnings of the magical light-bulb algorithm is much more hopeless and foolish than wishing to find a needle in a haystack; particularly so considering that all the evidence indicates the needle does not exist anyway. Instead, it is far more practical to simply propose a basic model, test how much data it explains, and whenever we observe anything that does not match the model's predictions, make the necessary corrections and extensions, until little by little we eventually achieve a coherent explanation of the whole thing.

* Human societies are and excellent example of how populations of self-minded units competing against and cooperating with one another (much like the neurons in the animal brain) do not require the intervention of a global intelligent agent, in order to evolve a sense of collective identity and self-awareness, as well as to lead to the emergence of all sort of global feelings and the expression of incredibly sophisticated ideas and intelligent conducts.

Indeed, if the vehicle were a kingdom, it would be certainly logical  to think, that the king will determine his foreign policies guided by the friendship he feels for the other nations' sovergns. However, for instance, in a truly democratic society (that is, not the kind of  truly repugnant and evil spawn we nowadays call Democracy), the institution vested with the nation's sovereignty may vote to keep a relationship of friendship with other polities; but that would not mean there is any kind of feeling of friendship. Indeed, we may want to ask ourselves: how did Ancient Egyptians come to think of themselves as members of the nation of Egypt (even long after the Pharaoh had disappeared). For that sake, we may as well ask: how did the settlers of British North America come to think of themselves as citizens of the U.S.? Moreover, why did they take up arms to fight for their new nation's independence?

Without a doubt, the emergence of consciousness and reason is such a miraculous phenomenon, that it is only natural to come to believe it must have been an act of sheer magic. However, the study of self-organizing dynamic systems show, how some very basic rules of behavior operating in each of the hundreds, thousands or millions of units of a complex system's population, are enough to lead to the emergence of stable patterns of miraculously spectacular complexity and beauty. As a matter of fact, we do not need to look far and deep in the abstract world of theory. Modern human societies are probably the best proof of how massive populations of self-minded individuals competing against and cooperating with one another - much like the neurons in our brains - can and do evolve into patterns of incredible complexity (if anything, we only need to work a bit on the miraculous beauty part...).    

* We already know how the neurons in the frog's brain might be able to intelligently select one among many alternative complex actions. A cold, lifeless artificial-intelligence algorithm is likewise able to elaborate a complex plan of action to achieve victory in a (simple) chess game. . If only we could understand how do we form ourselves concepts of things; we would have all the components needed to build a neural model, where countless populations of neurons employ some abstract knowledge to achieve some goal far ahead into the future.

Moreover, we already saw, how a frog may be able to choose one item in today's menu, without any animated decision-making agent. Yet, admittedly, planning a course of action to drive a vehicle from Point A to Point B requires a little bit more, than just snapping at some fly. After all, for all the skills and talents God has most certainly gifted upon frogs, they have not yet been able to develop complex societies, featuring sophisticated institutions such as religions, political systems, journalism, literature, scientific research, health systems, etc. Perhaps, our froggy pal is able to show, that the technical skill involved in the act of snapping at a fly amount to the resolution of a complex system of differential equations; but, for one thing, it does not seem it should require the elaboration of a complex plan of action, of the sort, say, an artificial intelligence algorithm implements, in order to find how to move next in a chess game. Chess certainly involves the kind of intellectual skills commonly associated with human reasoning. Now, it would not be difficult to conceive a neural architecture implementing a chess strategy. Yet, Chess is not such a big deal.

Can you imagine how much more complicated it would be, if all the individual pieces in each type would not work exactly the same. Can you imagine how many more combinations it would be necessary to explore, if we had to account for all the specific peculiarities of each piece? Can you imagine how much more difficult it would be, if we had to consider, that, say, Knight Mario is actually pretty old and he may occasionally fail to defeat and capture the strongest of the opponent's pawns? Can you imagine how much uncertainty it would create, if the opponent's king may in some cases be a young and athletic guy and therefore be sometimes able to move more than just one square at a time?

* If there are no concepts, there is altogether nothing to be conscious about. For instance, how may anyone be able to write a cooking recipe, if he does not have any concept of the ingredients or techniques employed?  

Indeed, if Chess is so much easier is because everything is stereotyped. Now, that is exactly what we do, when we form a concept of something; namely, we extract the essence of how the 'thing' works, leaving the minor details aside, and keeping instead the important stuff. We then give the 'thing' a name and from that point on, whatever is 'recognized' as such, will be addressed and handled accordingly. Hence, it is not just a matter of mere efficiency, but concepts constitute the core of our sheer consciousness and ability to reason: Namely, if there are no concepts, there is altogether nothing to be conscious about. Definitely, we need to form concepts and give them names, in order to represent and simbolize our knowledge of the corresponding 'things'. If we do not have any concept of wrinkles, how are we going to represent the conscious knowledge, that "the wrinkles thing next to the outer corner of the eyes indicate a person's advanced aged"? How are we going to plan any chess strategy, if we do not have any concept of the chessboard and its 64 squares, or any of the 6 different types of pieces. Can you imagine how difficult it would be to write a cooking recipe, if we could not just assume that, for example, all eggs basically have the same properties, and any of them would do (work) to 

help bind ingredients, give volume to batter, emulsify liquids, thicken sauces, provide that distinct flavor, clarify liquids and even add a nice color or glaze?   

Consequently, if we want to build a model capable of any sort of rational thinking and strategic planning we come full circle to the previous question of, how are concepts formed? If we can figure out how do we form ourselves concepts of things; we would have all the components needed to build a neural model, where countless populations of neurons employ some abstract knowledge to achieve some goal far ahead into the future.

* In fact, we get the great majority of our concepts from someone else's explanation. But, if that is the case, how did that person acquire those concepts in the first place?

Since it seems utterly unsatisfactory to settle the matter with the bluntly simple explanation of some decision-making agent having an aha moment, and - given we are so smart - we agreed we can do better than that; we already made our "quest for the origin of concepts" difficult enough, that it would be wise of us to start with the simplest cases. Indeed, there are definitely many instances, where there is no mystery of what led us to form a concept of some 'thing'. In fact, in the great majority of the cases (though likely not always), it is somebody else, who teaches us some concept. Our mother is probably the person from whom we learn most of the stuff. She, for instance, is who taught us the concept of brotherhood. When we were little, she explained our siblings were not like any other people, but they were of a very special kind. Rather, our siblings loved us, cared for us and we could always count on them. Obviously, she expected us to love and care for them as well. Yes, mom has always wanted the family to be united.

     However, even if all our knowledge had come from mom or someone else, that would still not solve our question. Indeed, we would still be before a chicken-and-egg problem; namely, if we got it from mom, where did she got it from? It seems like, at the end of the day, someone must have had an aha moment. But then, when and how did that happen?

* A baby's cry for help: our first aha moment and how it gives rise to our most basic concept.

At this point, it may be helpful to ask, why do newborn babies cry? The question may sound rather silly, since obviously babies cry because they feel some need, that requires attention from somebody else. Now, if we assume the existence of a decision-making agent, it seems reasonable to consider, if, perhaps, there are times where the baby is just being manipulative. There are certainly instances, where one would swear that the baby is only crying for the sake of getting some love and attention. On the other hand, admittedly, the proponents of the decision-making agent line of thinking could bery reasonably argue that a newborn's screams are only an instinctive conduct, and it is just that, at some point in the baby's early life, its intelligent, decision-making agent will wake up. This second part of the argument certainly leaves very unclear what leads to the miraculous awakening of the intelligent agent; but, in any case, it is not at all far fetched to conjecture, that Evolution slowly wired up such a behavior in our brains: whenever the baby experienced some need (even if this is only emotional), the baby would instinctively start screaming. Those babies who developed such conduct would evidently enjoy an evolutionary edge, since those who did not would not receive proper attention and care, even in the direst of crises. Now, even if we accept that babies screams are (originally) just instinctive gestures, it is not lost on anybody, that at some point they become part of a manipulating scheme. There is indeed no doubt, that in many occasions a baby will start crying only to get a fancy. It may be a candy or a stuffed animal it has just totally fallen in love with. Since the baby will normally at that time barely be able to speak, it will franctically point to the thing to make its 'needs' clear. It is only that eventually mom will explain such manipulating attitudes are not OK!: "Sweetheart, if you want something, you politely ask for it; but do not just scream, because I will then definitely not buy it!" At the end of the day, as we all know, the baby will follow whichever conduct yields the desired prize. If mom does not follow through with her moral teachings and screams are all what the baby needs to get its way, it will continue repeating such attitude, until the day that it finally does not work anymore. 

In summary, life is so much easier as a newborn!: In those first weeks, since nobody can expect a newborn to know how to ask for things politely, - regardless of whether the newborn's cry expressed some real necessity, or only the wish for a fancy - everybody would run to attend its every desire. Hence, importantly, - regardless of whether the newborn's cry was an instinctive or concious behavior - we would have to agree that, for all intends and purposes, the baby successfully expressed its thoughts and transmitted its will. Furthermore, since everytime it cried everybody would run to fulfill all its desires, - regardless of whether its conduct had been originally instinctive or conscious - it will not be long before our little angel becomes 'aware', that screams are all the magic words it takes to get some prize. Indeed, if our sweetheart's crying began as an instinctive gesture and eventually developed into a (conscious) manipulating scheme, it is interesting to ask what led to such transition, or, if you so prefer, what led to the awakening of the baby's intelligent agent? Well, it stands to reason to say, that our sweetheart's brain, little by little, put together the connection between the crying gesture and the baby's needs being addressed. Alternatively, if you favor the intelligent agent line of thinking, I guess you can say the baby's decision-making agent had an aha moment; in fact, a truly fantastic one, indeed!, or is there anything better in life than a magical recipe to get everybody to do as you wish? From a scientific perspective, though, the moment should represent the formation of the first concept (in all likelihood the very first concept in a human's life): "'crying' is the thing that gets everybody to do as I wish". No doubt about it, Chess is so much easier when we are babies!: all what it takes to win is the king to cry a little. It is then too bad that it will not be long before Chess will soon get so much more complicated. Indeed, much to every baby's disappointment, such magical recipe will soon stop working, and it will become necessary to use some real, human-language words. Yet, how on Earth is our sweetheart going to learn to ask for things politely, if it does not know their names nor has formed any concept of them; but all what it has figured out so far, is to scream and point at the thing in question? Even worse, what if the baby is born to a world, where mom does not know any name nor has yet formed herself any concept of anything either?

* From the very beginning, we have been learning concepts, as we have been learning the language.

   All over the globe, palaeontologists have found fascinating prehistoric figurative cave paintings, such as hand stencils and animal figures. To the degree that it seems reasonable to assume they were made without any clear purpose in mind, these representations are generally understood as pure expressions of art. It is one more of a million other instances, showing how we are constantly projecting our very own conventions into other folks, other times and or other places. If a modern human being paints something on a wall, there is certainly no specific purpose into it; but it is just an expression of art. However, there is no good reason why this must necessarily have been the case for other folks, living in totally different times and places. Indeed, it should not be totally out of mind to conjecture several different specific reasons, why prehistoric humans (not only homo sapiens, but other related species such as Neanderthals as well) may have actually wanted to paint these silhouettes: Perhaps, someone wanted to tell the group he or she had spotted a herd of buffalos,, so that they would all go together to hunt a few of them. Another possibility is that these representations were part of some early form of primitive school lectures, where the instructor use the paintings to teach the name of things to the pupils. Fascinatingly, view in this (very peculiar) light, prehistoric cave paintings could very reasonably be seen as the earliest expressions of writing (after all, the first writing systems began with the employment of clay tokens to count and record goods).

Now, obviously, all these ideas on the possible purpose of prehistoric figurative cave paintings are most absolutely purely speculative, and there is clearly no way anybody could ever bring forward any evidence to ascertain, what the heck was going through the author's mind. Nevertheless, even if we accept that these representations were nothing but pure expressions of art, made without any kind of purpose in mind, there is still something there cannot be any doubt about. Indeed, in any event, we could still say with absolute certainty, that the painter was thinking about the figure in question (whether this was a hand, some animal or anything else). Consequently, even if the author had no intention and the painting had no purpose, for all intends and purposes the author transmitted his or her thought. But, is not the transmission of thoughts what language is all about? Indeed, we can extend the reasoning further: Even if the gesture had been totally unintentional, it would not have taken a rocket scientist to realize, that, from here on out, whenever someone wanted to transmit some thought or piece of information, sketching some figure on a surface was an excellent means to accomplish such goal.

* Learning nouns and the acquisition of the most basic concepts: The first step to acquire a concept is to find out the thing's name, and there is no simpler method to indicate which thing we are thinking about and referring to than to point at the thing in question.

As a matter of fact, it is then not difficult to see a reason why our understanding of the world is so predominantly shaped by the visual modality. Undoubtedly, we learn from other people most of what we know about the world around us. But, clearly, long before we can understand any word anybody says, we can see and perceive everything around us. Long before we are aware of any name, we know perfectly well how everything looks like: all what we need is someone to tell us what is the name, we should from then on recognize the thing by. If we barely understand any language (as when we are babies, or as it would have been the case for a primitive person living tens of thousands of years ago) the most straightforward way for someone to teach us a name is by pointing at the thing and indicating what is the right term commonly used to refer to it. From then on, whenever somebody says that word, at the very least, we will know, we will have a concept of, how that thing looks like. Without a doubt, if we have not yet found out, it will not be long before we also add to our knowledge, what is the thing good for.

Yes, it makes sense to say, that concepts are created or acquired, when they get a name; but we should not forget that names are only the means, not the ends. Indeed, the point here is not to learn the name of things; but to know what are they good for. So far we may have found out, how to refer to things; but we have not yet really accomplish anything, let alone learned how things work. Put in a different way, a language is not of much use, if it only consists of nouns. Rather, we need adjectives, verbs, adverbs and prepositions, as well.

* Learning verbs, adjectives, adverbs and prepositions; learning what things are good for: The simplest method to learn what things are good for and how to accomplish things is to have somebody show us how to resolve the task in question.

Undoubtedly, the most common method to learn how to accomplish something, is to observe somebody else carrying out the task, and then imitate that person's performance. In fact, unless the matter is of the kind that confers any power, we can be sure that our role model will love to show off his or her knowledge and will not hesitate to explain how to go about it. If anything, teaching would havve been quite a bit of a challenge before humans developed any full-fledged language.

It would be useful to imagine how a primitive mother could have taught her kid, how to prepare some food; let us say, some bread. Even more so if there had not been any language available, the most natural and effective way would certainly have been to showcase the process herself. Now, how would you go about it, if you want to show a recipe to someone, who does not speak your language? Even more, what if (much like our primitive mother) you would not speak yourself any full-fledged language? Probably, as you go through the steps, you would point at things and indicate the terms you will employ to refer to them. When it comes to the actions you perform along the way (such as grinding, mixing, kneading, spreading, roasting, etc.), there is, though, no need to say anything. I guess there is a reason, why it is usually a bit harder to remember the right verb commonly employed to describe the specific gesture. However, if you just cannot come up - or simply do not know - the right term, you will frequently utter some sound resembling the noise the action in question produces (for example, wash, hack, stir, bubble, etc.). In all likelihood, that is exactly what our primitive cooking instructor would have done.

* As we learn more and more words, as we find out how to refer to things and actions, as we acquire more and more (conscious) concepts, we become able to spell out, write down, save and transmit natural language scripts, of what things are good for and how to accomplish stuff.

Clearly, through experiences of this sort, humans in the past should have come up with - and humans in the present commonly learn - the names of all kinds of things, as well as acquired knowledge on how to accomplish stuff. In other words, humans in the past conceived or defined most of the concepts known today, so that hundreds or thousands of years later we only need someone else to teach them to us. Clearly, the wheel only had to be invented once. From then on, once it got a name, and everybody could see what is good for and how it works, the knowledge only had to be transmitted and spread over, from one generation to another, to all other folks.